Your Smart Scale is Leaking More than Your Weight: Privacy Issues in IoT

These days IoT devices are an easy entry point for malicious users to invade users' privacy. With that in mind, we tested the AEG Smart Scale PW 5653 BT, specifically the Bluetooth security (Bluetooth Low Energy or BLE). We also tested the mobile applications Smart Scale for Android and Smart Scale for iOS. To complete our tests, we used our commercial static application security testing tool CxSAST, some tools we made ourselves, and open source software. The Checkmarx Security Research Team found several security issues that have impact on the clients using the smart scale, its associated apps, and for the company itself.

Security Issues by Severity

We ranked the security Issues we found from high to low based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System Calculator Version 3 (CVSS 3) score. Here's an overview of the issues we found and what the possible attack scenarios might be. Denial of Service (Medium - CVSS 7.1) Possible attack scenario: An attacker could trigger a special request via BLE that crashes the smart scale. The victim needs to remove the batteries or wait until the batteries run out. Keep in mind that the device loses most of its information during this crash. Changing privacy settings (Medium - CVSS 5.3) Possible attack scenario: A malicious user - within BLE range - could track the victim because the device keeps the MAC address fixed due to a configuration in the Generic Attribute Profile (GATT). GATT establishes in detail how to exchange all profile and user data over a BLE connection. Changing device name (Medium - CVSS 5.3) Possible attack scenario: An attacker - within BLE range - could change the name of the device to something offensive or even to trick innocent users. Also it can be used to better identify the specific device to aid in combining this attack with other attacks. Mobile application (Smart Scale) Man-in-The-Middle (Medium - CVSS 4.8) Possible attack scenario: Some requests made by the mobile application don’t use HTTPS, which might allow malicious users to intercept the information sent between the mobile application and the host.

Hardware Reconnaissance

Next, we investigate the hardware — in this case, the scale itself. Here's an overview of what we learned. BD ADDR 98:84:e3:36:a7:56 Characteristics/services with write permission: READ WRITEREAD WRITEREAD WRITEREAD WRITEREAD WRITE
Handle Characteristic Service Properties
0003 78667579-a914-49a4-8333-aa3c0cd8fedc ? WRITE
000c 29f11080-75b9-11e2-8bf6-0002a5d5c51b ? WRITE
0013 00002a02-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb Peripheral Privacy Flag READ WRITE
0015 00002a03-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb Reconnection Address READ WRITE
001e 78667579-db57-4c4a-8330-183d7d952170 ?
0020 78667579-5605-4f75-8e54-fceb7ea465a9 ?
0022 78667579-d0fd-4b77-9515-d03224220c29 ?
0024 78667579-e255-4c76-8a12-7be9b176e551 ?
0029 78667579-ae48-4e5b-ae14-b8eb728398ec ?
002b 78667579-5773-439a-bbcd-7672550a181b ? READ WRITE
0042 00002a06-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb Link Loss -> Alert Level READ WRITE
0045 00002a06-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb Immediate Alert -> Alert Level WRITE NO RESPONSE
Permissions required by the mobile application: android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN android.permission.BLUETOOTH android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS android.permission.VIBRATE android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE android.permission.INTERNET android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION


AEG Smart Scale Now that we've gone over the security issues by severity and the hardware settings, let's take a look at the vulnerabilities. One of the things we try in every assessment is to fuzz some bytes to see if it triggers things that should not happen. In this case we noticed that the service Immediate Alert -> Alert Level allowed us to write. So we tried to write one byte with the value 1. A single request didn't result in any issues, but after a couple of requests, it crashed the smart scale. It was a bit difficult to replicate, but we found a pattern. When the smart scale was in standby and anyone sends the request below, it will crash the smart scale. char-write-req 0x0045 01 We wrote a small proof-of-concept exploit (using pygatt python lib) to replicate it.
  1. It connects to the device.
  2. Sleeps for 5 seconds (meanwhile the device enters standby mode).
  3. Sends the request.
  4. Crashes the smart scale.
Now the only way to get the smart scale working again is to remove one of the batteries or wait until they run out, because the screen is frozen with the light on. We kept it for 30 minutes and the smart scale never went off. It's also important to mention that resetting the smart scale removes information, such as other configuration steps the user took in the past. So we must also consider that the integrity of those settings is at stake also. Watch a quick video showing what happens:

Changing Privacy Settings

The privacy flag defines if the device sends the original BD address (the unique 48-bit identifier assigned to each Bluetooth device by the manufacturer) in the BLE advertisements packets. If privacy is enabled, the device changes the BD address randomly, making it very hard to track the user. By default, this smart scale has Privacy Disabled, so it’s possible to track a user. This option should not have the property set to WRITE and should be enabled by default. If a user has experience with connecting to Bluetooth devices, he or she can use GATTTool to change it with the following request: char-write-req 0x0013 01 Changing Device Name An attacker could change the device name to another. Originally it has the value: VScale You can change the name using GATTTool: char-write-req 0x001e 064f574e000000 This request changes the device name to OWN. For some reason, 06 must be an operation code, because you will need that byte to change the name.

Smart Scale Man-in-The-Middle

Monitoring the mobile application Smart Scale we noticed that some requests are sending packets without https:

Mobile Application

The mobile applications (Android and iOS) were developed by a Chinese company named VTrump, which makes IoT applications for companies like AEG, Texas Instruments and Realtek. One of the things we noticed about the mobile application, which is referred to in the AEG Smart Scale package, is that many users are reporting that some mobile antivirus tools are blocking the app.

Smart Scale for Android App

So let’s take a look at the permissions needed on Android: android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN android.permission.BLUETOOTH android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS android.permission.VIBRATE android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE android.permission.INTERNET android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Immediately some of these permissions triggered alerts for our research team, such as ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, and ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION. Why does this smart scale app need to know the user's location or have permission to write on external storage? Also the app has the ability to change the permissions for MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS, which allows it to mount and unmount file systems for removable storage. Why does a smart scale app need that? One of the packages loaded by the apps is This package has a service that allows it to download an Android Package Kit (APK) from the Internet:

com.umeng.common.a.c(DownloadingService.t, String.format("saveAPK: url = %1$15s\t|\tfilename = %2$15s", new Object[]{this.k.c, this.d.getAbsolutePath()})); HttpURLConnection a = a(new URL(this.k.c), this.d); Besides com.umeng, another package also requests the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) from the user: android.telephony.TelephonyManager.getDeviceId.The IMEI is the unique numerical identifier for each mobile device. Again, why does the smart scale app need that information?

  • umeng
  • tencent

Smart Scale for iOS App

Switching to the iOS ap, we noticed the following POST request to (http): (http) Here's what we learn from decoding the information that is sent:
mid2sid@H2yEAABwWVrVfAQAAAE8yNjI1ZGIzYTU5MjFiNTVlYzRjMGJhYTcxMDRlZWEyMGJiMDgwNjU4et 0ei Eem1510575869000+0mid1sid@H2yEAABCqVrVfAQAAAE8yNjI1ZGIzYTU5MjFiNTVlYzRjMGJhYTcxMDRlZWEyMGJiMDgwNjU4cm 0st 2sv 1.2.0ac Unknownav com.vtrump.vscalecc PTcl enlt 1510575876630+0ca
[26806]MEOct wifiMAC 02:00:00:00:00:00MAC2 11:22:33:44:55:66ssid REDACTEDmr
   280870912mt 25842688tr 1351158784tt    240294912cr 1bl  0.550000mid 4sid`H2yEAABCqVrVfAQAAAE8yNjI1ZGIzYTU5MjFiNTVlYzRjMGJhYTcxMDRlZWEyMGJiMDgwNjU4
What we'd like to focus is that private information is sent to a server in China (without https): Application version: 1.2.0 Navigator: Application: com.vtrump.vscale Country: PT Language: EN Phone Operator: MEO Router MAC:  11:22:33:44:55:66 Wifi SSID: REDACTED On Android, the information sent is much more complete. Android App: Information Sent from Smart Scale App Decoding that information, we get the following:
mid  3sid@@NDMDAO9Q8blfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=ac portalav 1.2.4MAC 02:00:00:00:00:00IMEI REDACTED IMEI REDACTED AID 8c58689033753714BTA 02:00:00:00:00:00db
   SELECLINEdm S6S4IN3Gmn AUCHANhn sp7731c_fs280_32v4kn 1cis armv7lcfeHswp
half thumb fastmult vfp edsp neon vfpv3 tls vfpv4 idiva idivt
vfpd32cm 41cbm 2419.91cc 2cfr 1200.0dfÏ Filesystem               Size
   Used     Free   Blksize
/dev                   229.1M    72.0K   229.0M   4096
/sys/fs/cgroup         229.1M    12.0K   229.1M   4096
/mnt                   229.1M     0.0K   229.1M   4096
/system                  2.1G     1.5G   680.6M   4096
/data                    4.6G   262.5M     4.3G   4096
/cache                 143.6M   240.0K   143.4M   4096
/productinfo           928.0K    84.0K   844.0K   4096
/sale                  928.0K   172.0K   756.0K   4096
/storage               229.1M     0.0K   229.1M   4096
/storage/emulated        4.6G   262.5M     4.3G   4096
/storage/67A7-1A18       1.8G     1.1M     1.8G   32768
/storage/self          229.1M     0.0K   229.1M   4096
mr 469136sd 1dsts@ 1vr 800hr 480sz 4,3rr  60sst@ 1n MC3XXX 3-axis
Accelerometerm 19.6133v  MC3XXXsst@ 5n CTP Light sensor(Noexist)m 1.0v
 CTPsst@ 8n CTP Proximity sensorm 1.0v  CTPfw
fv@ 6.0bv6TM_BASE_W16.43.2|sc7731C_CP0_modem|10-19-2016
release2@ww-linuxf4 #1
SMP PREEMPT Tue Nov 15 11:09:41 CST
2016bn 876803_V1.0_20161115blv unknownbfDSELECLINE/S6S4IN3G/S6S4IN3G:6.0/MRA58K/W16.44.4-14:user/release-keysal 23rf
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDABy3cVRfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1508950293201+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDABy3cVRfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1508950302268+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDABy3cVRfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1508950324717+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDABy3cVRfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1508950326254+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  1sid@@NDMDAM8YiH1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=cm 30000st 1sv portalav 1.2.4an Smart
Scaleak com.vtrump.smartscaleof 1sf 1cc PTcl ptlt 1509639592179+1ct UnknownMAC 02:00:00:00:00:00ur -60ut -1886MAC2 00:00:00:00:00:00ssid <unknown
ssid>em 57714um 57714mr 0mt 0tr 22368tt 22752bl  0,530mid
 2sid@@NDMDAM8YiH1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1509639592732+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAM8YiH1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1509639601525+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  1sid@@NDMDAFHLiH1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=cm 30000st 1sv portalav 1.2.4an Smart
Scaleak com.vtrump.smartscaleof 1cc PTcl ptlt 1509639637847+1ct UnknownMAC 02:00:00:00:00:00ur -60ut -1886MAC2 00:00:00:00:00:00ssid <unknown
ssid>em 103321um 103321mr 0mt 0tr 37216tt 37600bl  0,520mid
 2sid@@NDMDAFHLiH1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1509639637841+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAFHLiH1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1509639669965+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAFHLiH1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1509639688223+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAFHLiH1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1509639730975+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  1sid@@NDMDAF7Din1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=cm 30000st 1sv portalav 1.2.4an Smart
Scaleak com.vtrump.smartscaleof 1cc PTcl ptlt 1509639766888+1ct UnknownMAC 02:00:00:00:00:00ur -60ut -1886MAC2 00:00:00:00:00:00ssid <unknown
ssid>em 232347um 232347mr 0mt 0tr 37216tt 37600bl  0,510mid
 2sid@@NDMDAF7Din1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1509639766878+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAF7Din1fAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1509639830621+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  1sid@@NDMDAOHyMpFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=cm 30000st 1sv portalav 1.2.4an Smart
Scaleak com.vtrump.smartscaleof 1sf 1cc PTcl ptlt 1509969556322+1ct UnknownMAC 02:00:00:00:00:00ur -60ut -1886MAC2 00:00:00:00:00:00ssid <unknown
ssid>em 95844um 95844mr 0mt 0tr 37216tt 37600bl  0,500mid
 2sid@@NDMDAOHyMpFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1509969558374+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAOHyMpFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1509969590073+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAOHyMpFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1509969599371+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAOHyMpFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1509969609660+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  1sid@@NDMDAM7ERpFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=cm 30000st 1sv portalav 1.2.4an Smart
Scaleak com.vtrump.smartscaleof 1cc PTcl ptlt 1509970855130+1ct UnknownMAC 02:00:00:00:00:00ur -60ut -1886MAC2 00:00:00:00:00:00ssid <unknown
ssid>em 1393567um 331637mr 0mt 0tr 37216tt 37600bl  0,490mid
 2sid@@NDMDAM7ERpFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1509970855118+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
 0mid  2sid@@NDMDAM7ERpFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Pem 1509970894521+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso
 0mid  1sid@@NDMDAKE+hJFfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=cm 30000st 1sv portalav 1.2.4an Smart
Scaleak com.vtrump.smartscaleof 1cc PTcl ptlt 1509974884006+1ct UnknownMAC 02:00:00:00:00:00ur -60ut -1886MAC2 00:00:00:00:00:00ssid <unknown
ssid>em 5422422um 401017mr 0mt 0tr 37216tt 37600bl  0,480mid
 1sid@@NDMDAO9Q8blfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=cm 30000st 1sv portalav 1.2.4an Smart
Scaleak com.vtrump.smartscalesf 1cc PTcl ptlt 1510653120785+1apn
"REDACTED-2g"ct wifiMAC 02:00:00:00:00:00ur 1330ut -6MAC2 48:7b:6b:b5:12:94ssid
"REDACTED-2g"em 212844um 212845mr 0mt 0tr 14025847tt 432395bl
 0,980mid  2sid@@NDMDAO9Q8blfAQAAAU0wMjowMDowMDowMDowMDowMEkzNTM4OTYwODQ0MTM0NDY=et 0ei Rem 1510653121547+1pi"com.vtrump.smartscale.MainActivityso 0sl
Here's a more readable version of the data sent to the Chinese server: MAC: 11:22:33:44:55:66 IMEI: REDACTED IMEI2: REDACTED Phone brand: SELECTLINE Filesystem: /dev, /sys/fs/cgroup, /mnt, /system, /data, /cache, /productinfo, /sale, /storage, /storage/emulated, /storage/self Phone functions: Light sensor, Accelerometer, Proximity sensor Kernel: release2@ww-linuxf4 #1 SMP PREEMPT Tue Nov 15 11:09:41 CST Wifi SSID: REDACTED-2g Lotuseed is a mobile data analysis software platform based in China. This data is sent without https, meaning that the communications between the app and Chinese server are not encrypted. After we notified VTrump about our findings, they declined to make the changes we suggested. Later, however, we tested again and found that they "fixed" the app by adding encryption, however, they were still sending the same private information. I don't believe that this type of information is necessary for a smart scale to collect, much less send to a third party for data analysis.

Smart Scale Fails at Security & Privacy

The Checkmarx Security Research Team advised AEG to launch a patch that fixes clients' smart scales to prevent malicious users from damaging the hardware. We tried to contact AEG to determine if they sold the brand rights for this type of equipment to any Chinese company, but we didn’t get any response to that question. We also noticed during our research that a lot of clients have issues with the mobile applications, especially because of the bad reputation of the URL used by the app. Based on our research findings, we recommend that you do not use either the Android or iOS app. The permissions these apps require are beyond what is necessary for a smart scale, and the apps share private data insecurely with third-party clients.
Watch: Your Smart Scale Is Leaking More than Your Weight: Privacy Issues in IoT hbspt.cta.load(146169, '15ec501b-a098-46b8-9c07-f53efa2e338f', {});

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